Bargaining Frictions, Labor Income Taxation and Economic Performance

A matching model with labor/leisure choice and bargaining frictions is used to explain (i) differences in GDP per hour and GDP per capita, (ii) differences in employment and hours worked (per capita and per worker), (iii) differences in the proportion of part-time work across countries. The model predicts that the higher the level of rigidity in wages and hours the lower are GDP per capital, employment, part-time work and hours worked, but the higher is GDP per hour. In addition, it predicts that a country with a high level of rigidity in wages and hours and a high level of income taxation has higher GDP per hour and lower GDP per capita, employment and part-time work than a country with less rigidity and a lower level of taxation. This is due mostly to a lower level of employment. In contrast, a country with low levels of rigidity in hours and in wage setting but with a higher level of income taxation has a lower GDP per capita and a higher GDP per hour than the economy with low rigidity and low taxation. In this configuration, the level of employment is similar in both economies but the share of part-time work is larger. The model accounts well qualitatively for the facts, and a plausible calibration accounts well qualitatively for the differences between the US, French and Dutch economies